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EXTRA MAJORITY ELECTION RULES
IN RETROSPECT
On June 7, 1971, in Gordon v. Lance,' the Supreme Court reversed
a decision of the WNest Virginia Supreme Court2 and held that the
requirement of the West Virginia Constitution that revenue bonds
must be approved in a referendum by at least 60 per cent of all votes
cast therein before local governments are authorized to issue such
bonds3 did not violate the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution.-
In reversing the West Virginia court, the Supreme Court distin-
guished prior decisions5 concerning infringements upon the vote from
the issue presented by extra majority rules as found in the West
Virginia Constitution. The significant distinction found by the Court
was that an extra majority requirement does not "fence out" from
the vote nor dilute the vote of an "independently identifiable group,"
such as voters belonging to a certain race or living in a certain
geographic area. 6 The Court also observed that the Federal Constitu-
tion itself contains provisions requiring extra majorities/ implying
that if extra majority rules are proper for the United States Constitu-
tion, the constitutionality of the use of such rules by the states should
not be questioned.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Gordon was the basis for the
summary disposition of cases then pending before the Court which
also presented the issue of the constitutionality of extra majority
rules in other states.8 An analysis of one of these cases, Brenner v.
1. 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
2. Lance v. Board of Education, 153 W. Va. , 170 S.E.2d 783 (1969),
aff'd sub nom. Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
3. W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S.
368 (1963).
6. 403 U.S. at 5.
7. Id.
8. Bogert v. Kinzer, 403 U.S. 914 (1971), aff'g 93 Idaho 515, 465 P.2d 639
(1970); Brenner v. School District, 403 U.S. 913 (1971), aff'g 315 F. Supp. 627
(W.D. Mo. 1970); Alhambra City School District v. Mize, 403 U.S. 927 (1971),
af'g 2 Cal. 3d 806, 471 P.2d 515, 87 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1970); Rimarcik v. Johan-
sen, 403 U.S. 915 (1971), aff'g 310 F. Supp. 61 (D. Minn. 1970); Westbrook v.
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School District,9 provides an insight into some of the many issues
raised as to the constitutionality of extra majority voting rules.
Elections were held on May 20 and July 1, 1969, in Kansas City,
Missouri, in an attempt to gain voter approval of an increase in the
tax levy for support of the school district of the city. Both times a
simple majority of the voters approved the levy increase, but each
time the levy increases failed to pass because less than two-tlfirds of
the voters voted for approval, as required by the Missouri Constitu-
tion.O Plaintiffs, qualified voters of Kansas City who supported the
tax increase, sued in district court for a declaratory judgment to de-
termine the constitutionality of the Missouri Constitution's two-thirds
majority requirement.
The plaintiffs contended that those articles of the state constitution
and the enabling legislation enacted under them which required
extra majority elections were a denial of the republican form of gov-
ernment. The plaintiffs also argued that an extra majority rule was
a dilution of the vote and thus an infringement of a basic constitu-
tional right which may be justified only by a showing of a compelling
state interest; otherwise such an infringement on the right to vote
would be a denial of equal protection of the laws.11
The district court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the Mis-
souri Constitution's two-thirds rule was in conflict with the concept
of a republican form of government and held that the plaintiffs' re-
liance on The Federalist to support their argument was misplaced.
As for the plaintiffs' argument of a denial of equal protection of the
laws, the district court concluded that prior Supreme Court decisions
in voting rights cases rejected equal protection arguments similar
enough to the argument in Brenner to be controlling. The district
Mihaly, 403 U.S. 922 (1971), aff'g 2 Cal. 3d 765, 471 P.2d 487, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839
(1970). The Gordon court did not rule as to the constitutionality of extra majority
rules if applied to the election of representatives or if the rule demanded an
extremely high percentage of the vote. 403 U.S. at 8 n.6.
9. 315 F. Supp. 627 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
10. Mo. CoNsT. art. 6, § 26(b):
Any county, city, incorporated town or village or other political corporation
or subdivision of the state, by vote of two-thirds of the qualified electors there-
of voting thereon, may become indebted in an amount not to exceed five per
cent of the value of the taxable tangible property ....
Mo. CONST. art. 10, § 11(c):
In all municipalities, counties and school districts the rates of taxation as
herein limited may be increased for their respective purposes when the rate
and purpose of the increase are submitted to a vote and two-thirds of the
qualified electors voting thereon shall vote therefore ....
11. 315 F. Supp. at 628-29.
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court held that there was no violation of the one man-one vote prin-
ciple by a dilution of the vote in elections for approval of tax levies
or municipal revenue bonds, because the one man-one vote principle
was only applicable to the election of representatives. In any case,
the court concluded that only the traditional equal protection test
was required in judging the constitutionality of the two-thirds rule,
and found that the Missouri extra majority rules did in fact satisfy
the test of compelling state interest. 12
On the republican form of government issue the court found the
plaintiffs' reliance on The Federalist No. 22 to be misplaced and "out
of context." 3 The district court supported this conclusion by quot-
ing from No. 51, in which Hamilton said that "if men were angels
no government would be necessary," and No. 10, where Madison
spoke of the need to provide a system of checks and balances against
"the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority."14 But
it is the court's quotation from The Federalist which is out of context.
In No. 51 Hamilton was arguing for the principle of the separation
of powers now found in the Constitution, by showing the necessity of
such a separation with an analogy between the nature of government
and the nature of man.
But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections
of human nature? If men were angels, no government would be
necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor
internal controls on government would be necessary.' 5
It is difficult to understand how the court is able to infer from this
quotation an argument by Hamilton supporting the idea of minority
rule by means of an extra majority election rule.
In No. 10 Madison was concerned over the possibility of an "over-
bearing majority," but he was specifically concerned with the possi-
bility of a faction, be it minority or majority, which might gain power
and rule only through self-interest, to the detriment of others. But
Madison's solution was not that the will of a minority should hold
sway or that only the consensus of an extra majority would be suffi-
cient protection against rule by small factions. Instead his solution
was to "[e]xtend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of par-
12. Id. at 642.
13. Id. at 629.
14. Id.
15. The FEDERALIsT No. 51 at 285 (Colonial Press ed. 1901) (A. Hamilton).
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ties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the
whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citi-
zens . ...,16
It is difficult to understand why the plaintiffs' reliance on No. 22
was misplaced, as the district court stated. Hamilton argued against
the proposition that all states should have an equal voice. He feared
that equal representation among the states would in reality be in-
equality among the people, since a majority of the states might have
only a minority of the total population. Hamilton's fear of an elec-
tion scheme that would allow a minority of the people to hold the
power of decision over the will of the majority seems quite relevant
for an argument against the use of extra majority rules in elections
where in fact the power of decision is given to a minority of the
electorate.1Y
The court also gave considerable weight to the fact that in the Con-
stitution itself there is "the utilization of a two-thirds majority vote
on questions considered to be of particular difficulty and impor-
tance .... "I But this use of analogous provisions in the Constitution
to support state legislative or constitutional schemes has been rejected
by the Supreme Court in the past.19
Though the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' republican
form of government argument lacked support from The Federalist or
even prior Supreme Court decisions, it is still doubtful that this type
of argument is sufficient in and of itself to justify declaring extra
majority rules unconstitutional. Certainly, historical research to dis-
cover the intent of the founding fathers lends in the discerning of
the proper construction to be given the Constitution, but such his-
torical evidence divorced from almost two hundred years of judicial
16. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 at 50 (Colonial Press ed. 1901) (J. Madison).
17. Nearer the question of extra majority requirements, Hamilton goes on to
say that "[t]o give a minority a negative upon the majority (which is always the
case where more than a majority is requisite to a decision) is, in its tendency, to
subject the sense of the greater number to that of the lesser." THE FEDERALIST
No. 22 at 114 (Colonial Press ed. 1901) (A. Hamilton). And in further discuss-
ing the idea of requiring more than a majority, Hamilton observed that "ft]he
necessity of unanimity in the public bodies, or of something approaching toward
it, has been founded upon a supposition that it would contribute to security. But
its real operation is to.. .destroy the energy of government, and to substitute the
pleasure, caprice, or artifices of an insignificant, turbulent, or corrupt junto to the
regular deliberations and decisions of a respectable majority." Id.
18. 315 F. Supp. at 629.
19. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372
U.S. 368 (1963).
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interpretation should not be the sole basis on which to decide an im-
portant constitutional issue of today.
The district court's conclusion that the plaintiffs' equal protection
argument had already been rejected by the Supreme Court was based
on prior decisions by the Supreme Court in various voting rights cases
in which equal protection arguments were rejected.20 But for the most
part, the claimed infringements on the right to vote in the cases cited
by the court in Brenner were substantially different from the claimed
denial of equal protection because of the dilution of the vote by extra
majority rules. The Brenner court noted a Supreme Court decision
upholding an electoral scheme in which county school board members
were elected by appointed district school board members. 21 The
Supreme Court had rejected the equal protection attack by character-
izing this scheme as an appointive rather than an elective process. 22
Also cited were two multi-district cases, 23 but in these cases the claim
of a violation of the one man-one vote principle was rejected because
it was seen "merely as the basis of residency of candidates, not for
voting or for representation." 24
Of all the cases cited, only two rejected equal protection arguments
which might be considered as controlling the argument against extra
majority rules in elections. The first was an old decision in which
the Supreme Court upheld a Michigan plan for presidential elections
whereby presidential electors were voted for by districts rather than
at large. -5 Thus Michigan's electoral college vote could go to the
candidate who carried the most districts even though he might not
receive a majority of the state's popular vote. The continued vitality
of this decision in light of the one man-one vote principle is in serious
question.2e
20. Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 399 U.S. 901 (1970); Turner v. Clay,
397 U.S. 39 (1970); McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 U.S. 802 (1969);
Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967); Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S.
105 (1967); Forston v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231 (1966); Forston v. Dorsey, 379
U.S. 433 (1965); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
21. Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
22. Id.
23. Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967); Forston v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433
(1965).
24. 379 U.S. at 438.
25. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
26. The only evidence the district court gave for the continued vitality of
McPherson was Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23 (1968). But Justice Harlan has consistently rejected the one man-one
vote principle as not required by the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Reynolds
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The other case which might have been seen as controlling the equal
protection argument in Brenner was Turner v. Clay,2 7 a summary
decision in which the Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal
from a decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court. The South
Carolina court had upheld2s a provision of the South Carolina Con-
stitution which required that in incorporation elections of cities with
a prospective population of over 5,000, the approval "of a majority
of the electors residing and entitled by law to vote within the district
proposed to be incorporated,"29 was necessary. The Brenner court
concluded that the Supreme Court had made a decision on the merits,s0
when actually it is unclear whether the Supreme Court decision did
in fact rest on a conclusion that extra majority rules were not a denial
of the equal protection of the laws, because of the summary nature
of its decision. The fact that in Turner an incorporation election
was at issue may distinguish it from Brenner, because the Supreme
Court has traditionally given the states a great deal of leeway over
incorporation procedures.31 Also, the Supreme Court might have
viewed the rule requiring a majority of all potential voters instead of
only a majority of all actual voters in an election distinguishable from
the extra majority requirement of a two-thirds rule.
The district court further explained its rejection of the plaintiffs'
equal protection argument by concluding that
the primary difficulty with plaintiffs' one man, one vote argument
is that it fails to take into account the factual situation presented
in the apportionment cases in which that principle was articulated
and applied. Those cases related to elections in which repre-
sentatives are chosen to represent the people.32
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (dissenting opinion); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S.
368 (1963) (dissenting opinion); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (dissenting
opinion).
27. 397 U.S. 39 (1970), dismissing appeal from Clay v. Thornton, 253 S.C.
209, 169 S.E.2d 617 (1969).
28. 253 S.C. at 217, 169 S.E.2d at 620.
29. S.C. CoNsT. art. 8, § 2.
30. The district court cited considerable authority to support its contention that
such summary decisions by the Supreme Court are in fact decisions upon the
merits of the cases. See, e.g., Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922); Sugarman v.
U.S., 249 U.S. 182 (1919); Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Brown, 187 U.S.
308 (1902); STERN AND GROSSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 4.28 (1950).
315 F. Supp. at 643.
31. See, e.g., Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907); but see
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
32. 315 F. Supp. at 633. This distinction between the constitutional protection
given representative elections and elections for other types of decisions has been
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But attempts to determine the extent of constitutional protection given
to elections by a consideration of the purpose or impact of the elec-
tion have been consistently rejected by the Supreme Court. The same
strict equal protection test has been repeatedly applied to all elections
regardless of the subject or purpose when laws denying access to the
franchise have been attacked as a denial of equal protection.33
The Brenner court recognized these decisions, but distinguished
them since they did not speak to the issue of malapportionment.3 4
But the court essentially ignored the Supreme Court decision of Had-
ley v. Junior College District,35 in which the one man-one vote princi-
ple was applied to the election of trustees for a junior college district,
where dilution of the vote because of malapportionment was recog-
nized. Instead the Brenner court noted that Hadley reiterated the
principle that "once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines
may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,"3 and the court admitted that
this principle also had been applied in Kramer v. Union Free School
District 37 Cipriano v. City of Houma,38 and City of Phoenix v.
Kolodziejski. 9 The Brenner court concluded that these cases still have
not "presented the question of whether the Equal Protection Clause
commands the application of the political principle of majority rule
to a state school bond and tax levy election." 40 The court could see
no relationship between the application of the one man-one vote
principle in Hadley and its application to all types of elections
in which the vote may be unequally weighted.
In light of the decision in Hadley, it is hard to understand the
court's insistence in distinguishing between reapportionment cases and
extra majority cases, unless it makes this distinction to avoid contend-
given wide support. See Bogert v. Kinzer, 93 Idaho 515, 465 P.2d 639 (1970),
aff'd, 403 U.S. 914 (1971); Comment, Equal Protection of the Laws, 83 HARv. L.
Rnv. 1911, 1917 (1969-70); Note, judicial Activism and Municipal Bonds: Kill-
ing Two-Thirds with One Stone, 56 VA. L. RFv. 295, 318 (1970).
33. See, e.g., City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Cipriano
v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School District,
395 U.S. 621 (1969).
34. 315 F. Supp. at 634.
35. 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
36. 315 F. Supp. at 636, quoting from Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elec-
tions, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966).
37. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
38. 393 U.S. 701 (1969).
39. 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
40. 315 Supp. at 636.
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ing with the application of the one man-one vote rule to extra major-
ity elections, which would necessitate a per se prohibition of all extra
majority rules as a denial of equal protection. 41 But other cases have
struck down extra majority laws without categorically stating that all
extra majority laws are on their face an unconstitutional denial of
equal protection of the laws.42
Although the Brenner court concluded that only the traditional
equal protection test should have been applied to Missouri's two-
thirds rule, it found that the Missouri extra majority rule did in fact
meet the compelling state interest test.43 The district court decided
that the two-thirds requirement for the approval of the issuance of
general obligation bonds was justified by the past bad experiences
suffered by the state, as in the panic of 1873 when financial disaster
overwhelmed many local governments (this situation had been ag-
gravated by thoughtless incurring of debts by general obligation
bonds). Ever since then, Missouri legislatures have supported the
need to control strictly such future indebtedness by making it harder
for local communities to gain voter approval of bond issues. The
court pointed to historical evidence that if the two-thirds rule had
not been included, voters would not have approved past constitutions
for the state of Missouri.4 4 Further, the court noted that the support
of public education has always been a hotly contested political issue,
and that "experience established that unless at least two-thirds of all
the citizens in the proposed school district were committed in advance,
it would not be likely that the school would be adequately supported
by the local community."4
From the evidence it presented the court seems to have decided that
the compelling state interest test is met when a law deals with a ques-
tion over which the people have shown a great deal of anxiety and
concern. But in essence what the court has said is that the will of
the majority is insufficient when a hotly disputed issue is being con-
sidered. Although an extra majority rule is reasonably related to the
policy of discouraging future indebtedness of local governments, and
41. See, e.g., Lance v. Board of Education, 153 W. Va. - , 170 S.E.2d
783 (1969), af'd sub nom. Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
42. See, e.g., Rimarcik v. Johansen, 310 F. Supp. 61 (D. Minn, 1970), aff'd,
403 U.S. 915 (1971); Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d 765, 471 P.2d 487, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 839 (1970), aff'd, 403 U.S. 922 (1971).
43. 315 F. Supp. at 637.
44. Id. at 639.
45. Id. at 640.
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may help to insure that schools will be adequately supported by their
communities, there is still lacking a sufficient justification for state
infringement of its citizens' fundamental rights as required by the
compelling state interest test.
The case law which developed the criteria which a state must show
in order to demonstrate a compelling interest seems to have focused
upon the need for the state to use only that method of achieving a
proper goal for which there is no reasonable alternative that does not
infringe constitutional rights.46 The district court did not explain why
a two-thirds majority was the only reasonable alternative to achieve
protection against over-indebtedness by local governments or to guar-
antee widespread support for the state's public schools; and as for the
goal of obtaining the taxpayers' support for the schools, the claim
than an extra majority requirement on a school tax referendum is the
only method of generating enthusiasm for support of the public
schools is dearly without merit. Certainly, a program by the state to
improve relations between schools and communities or an upgrading
of the quality of public education (which might be effected by higher
school taxes) would also serve the policy of gaining public support
for the schools without infringing upon voting rights.
Not only did the district court fail to explain why the extra majority
rules were the only reasonable alternative for achieving the goals
which the court attributed to them, but the court also gave no evi-
dence to show that the two-thirds requirements in Missouri have fur-
thered the achievement of these goals. The court did not explain
how the defeat of past bond referenda and school tax levies has saved
local governments from bankruptcy nor how it has kept the people
from abandoning their public school system.
In Shapiro v. Thompson47 the Supreme Court suggested that sub-
stantial proof is necessary to show that infringement of a fundamental
right has markedly alleviated the problem which the state law in ques-
tion meant to solve.4" Given the vague, general nature of the goals
the Brenner court attributed to the two-thirds rule, the dearth of
actual evidence showing that use of the two-thirds rule has helped
to achieve the cited goals, and the absence of an explanation why an
extra majority requirement was the only reasonable method available
to the state to achieve such goals, the court failed to justify its con-
46. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
47. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
48. Id. at 635.
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clusion that Missouri's two-thirds rule satisfied the compelling state
interest test and thus justified an otherwise unconstitutional infringe-
ment of a fundamental right.
The court, however, did raise a serious question as to whether an
extra majority rule should be open to a constitutional attack as an
infringement upon one's right to vote, if such a rule is looked upon
as merely a "decisional rule" apart from the election itself.0 The
argument supporting this position seems to be, that as long as one is
not unjustly denied access to the vote, and as long as each vote is
counted and given equal weight, a state law that merely decides how
the votes are to be used or counted (whether a simple majority rule
or some extra majority rule is employed, or whether the vote is used
as controlling the issue of the election or as merely advisory upon the
state government) is sufficiently removed from affecting the citizen's
right to vote and thus is beyond constitutional attack.50
The problem with this argument is that it ignores the reality of the
actual effect of an extra majority rule. The logic that is able to dis-
tinguish between the dilution of the vote because of malapportion-
ment, and dilution of the final weight a vote is given because of a
two-thirds majority rule, fails to explain why this distinction should
be maintained when the outcome of either method of dilution is the
same. A minority of the voters is given the power of decision over
the will of the majority. By whatever means it is done, a dilution of
one's vote in "[ilts operation contradicts that fundamental maxim of
republican government, which requires that the sense of the majority
should prevail."51
With its decision in Gordon v. Lance, 2 in light of which Brenner
was summarily affirmed, the Supreme Court ignored the reality of the
impact of extra majority rules upon the effectiveness of one citizen's
vote and the logical relationship between an effective vote and the
right to vote. Instead the Court has restrained the inevitable logic
of its prior decisions53 by severely limiting the application of equal
49. 315 F. Supp. at 631.
50. See, e.g., Comment, Equal Protection of the Laws, 83 HARv. L. Rnv. 1911,
1918 (1969-70); Note, judicial Activism and Municipal Bonds: Killing Two-
Thirds with One Stone, 56 VA. L. REv. 295, 320 (1970).
51. TuE FEDERALIST No. 22 at 113 (Colonial Press ed. 1901) (A. Hamilton).
52. 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
53. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S.
368 (1963).
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protection principles in dilutions of the vote to instances where only
a dearly identifiable group is involved.
The affirmation of the constitutionality of extra majority rules
clearly marks a change in direction by the Supreme Court in protect-
ing the individual citizen's right to vote against diverse state electoral
schemes which infringe upon the right of each citizen to participate
fully and equally in the electoral process.
Mark D. Hirschfeld
Washington University Open Scholarship
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